Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2019

Digitizing Brandenburg: Common Law Drift Toward a Causal
Theory of Imminence
J. Remy Green

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the First Amendment Commons

REMY GREEN FINAL ARTICLE

6/20/2019 1:33 PM

DIGITIZING BRANDENBURG:
COMMON LAW DRIFT TOWARD A CAUSAL THEORY
OF IMMINENCE
J. Remy Green†
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 351
I.
BRIEF HISTORY OF [THE SPATIOTEMPORAL APPROACH]..... 357
A. Arriving at Brandenburg ............................................ 357
B. Brandenburg and the Internet .................................... 360
II.
EXAMINING THE COMMON LAW MODEL............................. 366
A. MacPherson and the Common Law Model of
Innovation................................................................... 366
B. The Spatiotemporal Imminence Regime is Unworkable,
and the Courts are Already Gravitating Toward
Applying a Causal Rule .............................................. 368
III. TOWARD A CAUSAL THEORY .............................................. 370
A. The Underlying First Amendment Theory and
Justification ................................................................ 371
B. Proximate and Imminent Causation in Tort Law ....... 375
C. Judge Posner’s Entrapment Machine ........................ 377
D. Applying Causal Theory to Modern Problems ........... 382
APPENDIX I ................................................................................... 386
APPENDIX II .................................................................................. 388
INTRODUCTION
“Too much magic could wrap time and space around itself, and that
wasn’t good news for the kind of person who had grown used to things
like effects following things like causes.”1

It should surprise no one when at long last we have some perspective
on the latest magical “hooziwhatzit” or “thingamaturg”; our new
technology is often not somehow fundamentally different than papyrus,
the printing press, the assembly line, or any number of other
technological leaps forward. Of course, that is not to attempt to refute the
† J. Remy Green holds a Juris Doctor from the University of Chicago Law School and
they are a partner with Cohen & Green. They are deeply grateful to (among others) Elena L.
Cohen, Mary Anne Franks, Kellie P. Desrochers, Kate Walling, Amanda R. Meltsner, Hannah
Cook, Jonathan Wallace, Micah A Prussack, and Zaphod B. Green for the close readings,
discussions, comments, and other help provided in countless, countless ways on this Article.
And, of course, the views expressed in this Article are wholly Remy’s own, and are not intended to express the views of any other person or institution.
1. TERRY PRATCHETT, SORCERY 30 (1988).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169952

REMY GREEN FINAL ARTICLE

352

6/20/2019 1:33 PM

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 69:351

obvious: facts on the ground do change with technology and the billiard
balls of cause and effect behave observably and meaningfully different
before and after a technological shift.2 And so it is with the internet and
free speech: causes and effects can be separated by previously unheard of
degrees of time and space, and those effects can be myriad and spread far
and wide.3
I do not imagine, reader, that I am telling you something new here.4
The assertion that the internet poses a few problems for the free speech
doctrine is almost as facially obvious as the assertion that things are a
little nippy out in the vacuum of space. I use these examples because both
are also notable for the fact that, while they seem obvious to us now, they
have not always been so—Fritz Lang’s 1929 Woman in the Moon had
space explorers tromping across the surface of the moon without helmets
in fall sweaters,5 while Orson Scott Card’s 1985 Ender’s Game
spectacularly fails to predict the horrible, mundane reality of Twitter and
Myspace when it imagines a tidy and orderly discourse on a global
information network in which two pseudonymous teens (taking on the
names of philosophers Locke and Demosthenes) gain fame and influence
for writing compelling and well-informed essays.6 Put somewhat
tautologically, these examples are especially notable in that they are only
2. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 40–55
(Charles W. Hendel, ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1955) (1748) (discussing necessary connections
between causes and effects).
3. See generally Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, Making America Hate Again? Twitter and Hate Crime Under Trump (May 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3149103 (finding robust correlation between regions with high consumption of the 45th President’s Islamophobic tweets and regions seeing
increases in anti-Muslim hate crimes).
4. Indeed, one of the primary “problem” cases I identify in this Article is a case involving a book and no internet use at all (Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir.
1997)), but the result and difficulty in that case predict exactly the dilemma that is unavoidable
in a post-internet age. See also JONATHAN WALLACE AND MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND
CYBERSPACE: FREEDOM AND CENSORSHIP ON THE FRONTIERS OF THE ONLINE REVOLUTION 194
(1996) (in 1996, arguing “[t]hroughout history, each major innovation in communications
technology has caused distress and confusion similar to what society is experiencing today
about the Internet. The introduction of writing, the printing press, the telegraph, the telephone,
the radio, and the television all raised similar issues.”).
5. See generally WOMAN IN THE MOON (Universum-Film Aktiengesellschaft (UFA)
1929).
6. See generally ORSON SCOTT CARD, ENDER’S GAME (1985). While this seems implausible as applied to the general population, it is worth noting that occasionally legal scholars
do try to create such discourse on Twitter through sheer force of will, personality, and good
writing. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Towards a Series of Academic Norms for #Lawprof Twitter, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 904–05 (“With its rigid character limits and focus on ‘hot takes,’
Twitter is arguably the antithesis of scholarship. . . . [L]aw professors, as a group, come to a
consensus about how we, as a group, ought to behave on Twitter.”). As an aside, I believe it
was from this Hessick article that I subconsciously aped the title to this piece.
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obvious as soon as they are obvious.7 In this Article, I argue that the same
will be true for speech that incites violence—such violence can be
causally “imminent” even when it is separated by wide chasms of space
and time, and the fact of such causal imminence is a sufficient basis to
allow restriction of speech without limiting its freedom.
Stepping back, the protections our Constitution offers for speech
doctrinally depend upon whether there is a clear and present danger of
imminent lawless activity.8 Checking for imminence before restraining
speech is the second element of Brandenburg v. Ohio’s two-part test—
speech receives no protection where it (1) is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action, and (2) is likely to incite or produce
such action—and is by now black letter constitutional law.9 The presence
vel non of imminence is classically analyzed in terms of spatial and
temporal imminence.10 To use the Oxford English Dictionary’s
definition, courts evaluate “[t]he state or fact of being about to happen.”11
But this way of looking at things has caused all sorts of theoretical
problems for legal thinkers. For example, consider the irony of the

7. See Randall Munroe, Honor Societies, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/703/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2019) (“Listen up! The first rule of Tautology Club is the first rule of Tautology
Club.”).
8. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
9. See id.; see also Timothy E. D. Horley, Note, Rethinking the Heckler’s Veto After
Charlottesville, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 8, 13 (2018).
10. One leading treatise explains:
For example, let’s say a speaker posts a column on the internet critical of a certain
racial minority, and calls on another racial group to rise up, defend their nationality
and protect the sanctity of his race. This hateful language could cause someone to
inflict violence on other racial groups. However, the speech would likely be protected
by the First Amendment because it did not incite imminent lawless action. At best, the
speech contributed to unlawful action at some indefinite point in the future.
On the other hand, let’s say that, at a political rally, a speaker gets up and addresses
the angry crowd. The speaker fulminates against deplorable conditions in the government and then says, “Let’s move on these police officers now.” Such a statement
would constitute incitement to imminent lawless action, because it would incite people to break the law and attack the surrounding police officers.
DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:2 (2012); see also
Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful
Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209, 240 (noting that Brandenburg has three requirements, the
second of which being described as requiring “the advocacy [to] call for immediate law violation”).
11. Imminence, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/imminence (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (emphasis added); see also Imminent, MERRIAMWEBSTER’S LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/imminent
(last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (defining imminent as “happening very soon”).
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“hostile audience cases”12—cases where harm is obviously “imminent”
in the sense of being temporally “about to happen”—where courts twist
themselves into yogic knots to avoid the (obviously undesirable) result
that a hostile audience might police the content of public speech.13
Yet, imminence has a range of meanings and it is not even true that
its primary or original meaning has anything to do with space and/or time.
One of imminence’s Latin roots—“minēre”—draws upon words meaning
“mountain,” and archaically it means “overhanging”; 14 thus, perhaps
suggesting more of an inevitability-based relationship than one of spatial
or temporal closeness—something overhanging will fall, it is just a
question of when. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary even uses a first
definition that describes imminence as a state of being “ready to take
place.”15 Why, then, should we think that Brandenberg’s imminence
element should be limited to spatiotemporal imminence?
My answer (to my own, obviously rhetorical question) is that we
should not. In this Article, I propose that imminence is better understood
as a causal question; it is a question of, for lack of a more artful
description, the “ready-to-take-place-ness” of the requisite lawless
activity. That is, the radical—though firmly grounded in common law
methodology16—shift I imagine is one that involves analysis of causal
proximity in terms of links in a causal chain. Rather than applying the
12. See Horley, supra note 9, at 12 (“The heckler’s veto or hostile audience problem arises
when speech is met with an audience that is likely to turn violent on the speaker—in such a
scenario, can the government shut down the speech, or must it allow the speaker to continue?
This problem is vexing and active.”).
13. See infra Appendix I (listing cases applying Brandenburg and their results); see also
Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992) (finding imposing a fee for
permits based on the expected law enforcement costs of protecting white supremacists from
counter protestors was inconsistent with the Constitution); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949)) (introducing
the “clear and present danger” test, and, in effect, though not in so many words, overturning
Feiner v. New York); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963) (“[C]onstitutional rights
may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise.”); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315, 317, 320 (1951) (upholding a conviction for disorderly conduct where
the speech at issue was alleged as being dangerous because it served “to arouse the Negro
people against the whites,” and marking the first appearance of the phrase “hostile audience”);
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 6 (overturning a conviction based on a statute that criminalized
“merely . . . invit[ing] dispute or . . . bring[ing] about a condition of unrest”); HARRY KALVEN,
JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 89 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988);
Frederick Schauer, The Hostile Audience Revisited, EMERGING THREATS, Nov. 2017, at 3,
https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Schauer_Hostile_Audience.pdf.
14. See Imminent (adj.), ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/imminent (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
15. Imminent,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imminent (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (emphasis added).
16. See David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 879 (1996).
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ostensibly spatiotemporal analysis with its concomitant variety of carveouts and exceptions that have developed since Brandenburg, I argue that
better and more readily predictable results come from the analysis of the
ready-to-take-place-ness of lawless activity. I further argue that, like in
the classic common law case lines,17 courts are already gravitating
towards this result.18 Thus, this Article provides examples where the
causal approach solves many of the cases that present theorists with
difficulty, in addition to dealing ably with emerging problems presented
by free speech online. I believe the results my approach generate square
well not only with common, a priori intuitions about correct decisions,
but also with the results in past watershed cases that have been either
lionized or importantly abandoned.19
Part I describes and clarifies the “spatiotemporal approach”
currently in use, including its questionable use in a number of cases that
seem to reach the right result despite tension with the stated rule. Part II
17. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916) (discussing the legal definition of imminence in the tort context).
18. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 263–67 (4th Cir. 1997) (avoiding
use of the Brandenburg test in ruling that civil liability could exist for the publication of the
book Hit Man, which included detailed instructions on how to engage in murder for hire); see
also State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53, 1995 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 930, at *16 (D. Mont. Nov. 8,
1995) (“Immediacy in time of result cannot be the entire test. . . . ‘Imminent’ harm means a
result that is highly predictable.”); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE
203–05 (2014) (using Rice as an illustration that some internet speech is analyzed under a
“crime-facilitating-speech” exception to the First Amendment, and that constitutional protection does not extend to the “intentional enablement of crime”).
19. More specifically, I think one common problem in this space is that it is extraordinarily difficult not to throw the baby out with the bathwater in reforming imminence tests. There
are plenty of scholars and judges who argue that imminence has no place in modern Brandenburg analysis anymore. See, e.g., Rice, 128 F.3d at 265 (“And, of course, to understand the
Court as addressing itself to speech other than advocacy would be to ascribe to it an intent to
revolutionize the criminal law, in a several paragraph per curiam opinion, by subjecting prosecutions to the demands of Brandenburg’s ‘imminence’ and ‘likelihood’ requirements whenever the predicate conduct takes, in whole or in part, the form of speech—an intent that no
lower court has discerned and that . . . we would hesitate to impute to the Supreme Court.”);
Tiffany Komasara, Comment, Planting the Seeds of Hatred: Why Imminence Should No
Longer Be Required to Impose Liability on Internet Communications, 29 CAP. U.L. REV. 835,
848–49 (2002) (internal footnote omitted) (“It is the . . . requirement that the action be imminent that creates an impossible hurdle to imposing liability on internet communications. . . .
The importance of the imminence standard is to justify a restraint on speech prior to the outbreak of violent conduct. There is no need for the imminence requirement when imposing
civil liability on illegal conduct that has already occurred.”); O. Lee Reed, The State is Strong
but I am Weak: Why the “Imminent Lawless Action” Standard Should Not Apply to Targeted
Speech that Threatens Individuals with Violence, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 207–08 (2000) (“The
[imminence] standard is ill-suited as a general category defining harm both in the context of
incitement or threat against the state and in the context of incitement, threat, intimidation, or
harassment against individuals. It should not apply to targeted speech that threatens or substantially harms individuals.”).
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explains the common law theory of the development of law that is
actually at work in the way courts analyze imminence and argues that the
current state of First Amendment imminence fits neatly into the
transitional stage of the common law model. Finally, Part III sets out the
causal approach I believe better explains the cases, explains more in depth
how my approach would resolve cases, and applies it to the problem cases
identified in Parts I and II. Part III also discusses some of the broader
social and political implications of the causal theory.
An aside: I am somewhat unsure where exactly to put this, but I
would be remiss if this went unsaid. Another viable explanation for a
good share of the cases—and one that is present at the very least
beginning with Brandenburg itself—is that the Supreme Court’s (and
other courts’) determinations have often been driven by latent and explicit
white supremacist sympathies on one hand and discomfort with leftist
and socialist ideology on the other.20 I should also make explicit that I
think rejecting white supremacy poses no great First Amendment
problem, while the rejection of leftist and/or anarchist thought that exists
in our First Amendment jurisprudence is largely doctrinally
unsupportable.21

20. I will not spend too much ink on this. See ELENA L. COHEN, “I’D RATHER GO NAKED”:
THE CASE FOR PROTECTING SEXUALITY (forthcoming 2019) (discussing how the United
States’ extraordinarily high protection of speech when compared with other constitutional
democracies is based in part on history of racism and anti-Semitism in the United States generally, and in attitudes of Supreme Court justices); MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2019) (exploring how the ACLU has helped white supremacy
maintain its monopoly on free speech). Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446
n.1, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam) (finding no imminence where speaker lead a rally that involved Klu Klux Klan members chanting “bury the niggers” and promising “revengeance”),
and United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 434–35 (2d Cir. 2013) (Pooler, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority should have applied Brandenburg, rather than the “true threat” doctrine, and finding no imminence in the exhortations of a white supremacist with a popular
blog toward “free men willing to walk up to them and kill” three judges), and United States
v. Henry (In re White), No. 2:07cv342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133148, at *222 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 13, 2013) (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447) (finding no imminence where speaker
posted personal details of people to be harassed on white supremacist internet forums), with
People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488, 488, 493 (1979) (finding imminence where the speaker
offered a reward for anyone “who kills, maims, or seriously injures a member of the American
Nazi Party” at an event five weeks away). Additionally, note the examples used in the treatise
cited supra note 10.
21. That particular point, however, is entirely orthogonal to my purposes here, and I do
want to stay focused on the task at hand. Another day, in another article, perhaps. See generally Mary Anne Franks, Beyond ‘Free Speech for the White Man’: Feminism and the First
Amendment, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Cynthia Bowman &
Robin West eds., Edward Elgar Pub. 2019).
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I. BRIEF HISTORY OF [THE SPATIOTEMPORAL APPROACH]22
In Brandenburg, and about four years later in Hess v. Indiana, the
Supreme Court articulated the test that has become known as the
Brandenburg test.23 It consists of three sufficient conditions24 for the
government to restrict speech when it does not fall into any of the
narrowly limited classes of speech that may permissibly be restricted:
“[(1)] advocacy . . . directed to inciting or producing [(2)] imminent
lawless action [that] is [(3)] likely to incite or produce such action.”25
This test has generally been lauded as a high water mark in the Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence.26
A. Arriving at Brandenburg
In brief, the Brandenburg formulation arrives at the end of half a
century of free speech cases in which various tests were adopted and
abandoned. Judge Learned Hand and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously debated their respective Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten28 and
clear and present danger29 tests in a series of letters following a chance
27

22. I am certain there is a good play on the title of the late Stephen Hawking’s A Brief
History of Time that should be the title of this Part, but for the life of me, I cannot seem to
find it.
23. 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).
24. The test is also sometimes framed as a two-part test, with the first two elements combined into “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” and leaving “likely to
incite or produce” as the second element. See, e.g., Legal Info. Inst., Brandenburg Test,
CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/brandenburg_test (last visited Mar. 1,
2019).
25. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
26. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 754 (1975) (“Brandenburg combines the most protective ingredient of the Masses incitement emphasis with the most useful
elements of the clear and present danger heritage.”).
27. While there is much significance and interest in the history of the Brandenburg test,
the task of recording and explaining that history has long since been handled by many far
more able than I. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 10, at 236–41 (chronicling the U.S. Supreme
Court’s drafting of the Brandenburg opinion and the subsequent effects of the holding); Andrianna D. Kastanek, Comment, From Hit Man to a Military Takeover of New York City: The
Evolving Effects of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises on Internet Censorship, 99 NW. U.L. REV.
383, 395–409 (2004) (analyzing how more recent cases have undermined protections provided under Brandenburg).
28. 244 F. 535, 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917). If words
“directly advocated” violation of the law, they can be prohibited, but “[i]f one stops short of
urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one
should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation.” Id.
29. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”).
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encounter between the two on a train from New York to Massachusetts.30
Following this conversation, Justice Holmes penned a fiery dissent in
Abrams v. United States,31 which marks both the first and second
appearance of the words “imminent” and “imminence” in the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would
justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to
produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith
certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek
to prevent. . . .
....
. . . While that experiment is part of our system[,] I think that we should
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country.32

Curiously for our purposes, the use in the dissent’s concluding passage
suggests that perhaps Justice Holmes saw “immin[ence]” as something
distinct from the temporal “immedia[cy]” he invokes two words later as
part of “immediate interference.”33 In his own time, however, Justice
Holmes’s test never moved beyond a dissent.34
In 1969, when the initial Brandenburg opinion was assigned to
Justice Abe Fortas, he drew upon Justice Holmes’s Abrams dissent for an
imminence-based formulation of the test: speech could be “proscribed
only where it [is] ‘directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is attended by present danger that such action may in fact be
provoked.’”35 Justice Hugo Black objected to this formulation, and any
formulation that reflected the clear and present danger test, but Justice
Fortas refused to strike the test.36 However, Justice Fortas was ultimately

30. Sometimes truth is stranger than fiction could possibly be, I suppose. See Schwartz,
supra note 10, at 218–19.
31. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 627, 630 (emphasis added).
33. See id. at 630.
34. Justice Holmes died in 1935. See G. Edward White, Holmes as Correspondent, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1707, 1710 (1990). Justice Holmes’s imminence test was adopted in 1969.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
35. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 237 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, draft opinion of Justice Fortas, Apr. 11, 1969, at 5 (Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Cong.)).
36. Id.
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forced to resign before the opinion could be issued.37 Thus, Justice
William Brennan took on the task of redrafting the opinion, which the
Court issued per curiam.38 Justice Brennan’s redrafted opinion contains
the now familiar Brandenburg test:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.39

In 1973, the Supreme Court took an early opportunity to refine and clarify
the Brandenburg test in Hess.40 In applying Brandenburg, Hess added
that “since there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import
of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to
produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by the
State on the ground that they had ‘a tendency to lead to violence.’”41
The formulation in Hess has, by and large, held. Thus, the Supreme
Court still cites Brandenburg for the proposition that “the First
Amendment protects advocacy even of unlawful action so long as that
advocacy is not directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.”42 But
Brandenburg came about in a world where even a fax machine might
have seemed space age, and the instantaneous and permanent
transmission of large quantities of information was neigh unthinkable.43
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
40. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).
The modern rule is, in fact, sometimes called “the Brandenburg-Hess test.” See Russell W.
Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 967 (1991).
41. Hess, 414 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added) (quoting Hess v. State, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415
(Ind. 1973)).
42. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 43–44 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,
717 (2012) (first citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); and then citing
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48) (“[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional categories
of expression long familiar to the bar. . . . Among these categories are advocacy intended, and
likely, to incite imminent lawless action.”); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786,
791 (2011) (first citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468; then citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–
48; and then citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)) (“[T]he First
Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,’
and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.’ These limited
areas—such as . . . incitement . . . represent ‘well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any [c]onstitutional problem.’”).
43. See, e.g., Hannah L. Cook, Flagging the Middle Ground of the Right to Be Forgotten:
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B. Brandenburg and the Internet
Modern applications of Brandenburg—especially in cases involving
the internet—have found courts wringing their hands over what they see
as Brandenburg’s demand for spatiotemporal imminence. What is most
notable in these cases is the palpable discomfort the courts (or the clerks)
have in wrestling with some of the forward-looking implications of their
decisions. Courts have found lawless activity is spatiotemporally
imminent where the speaker:44 sent an email encouraging “electronic civil
disobedience” on a specified date;45 published a book with detailed
instructions on how to become a “hit man”;46 counseled and directly
assisted preparing false tax returns;47 held up a sign on television at a
school event proclaiming “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”;48 and offered a
Combatting Old News with Search Engine Flags, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2017)
(“[T]here are more and more pieces of data available to help search engines connect subjects’
past and present lives. At a New York arts festival, almost four hundred people gave away
pieces of identifying information—such as their home addresses, fingerprints, or the last four
digits of their Social Security numbers—in exchange for a cookie. The printed terms of use,
which were signed by all but twenty of the people who took a form, gave the collector ‘the
right to do almost anything she wanted with the information.’”).
44. Since the cases encompass a variety of postures, for simplicity, I will discuss the cases
with reference to the person whose speech the government seeks to restrict.
45. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009).
Electronic civil disobedience involves a coordinated campaign by a large number of
individuals to inundate websites, e-mail servers, and the telephone service of a targeted company. Electronic civil disobedience also includes the use of “black faxes,”
repeatedly faxing a black piece of paper to the same fax machine to exhaust the toner
or ink supply. . . .
....
. . . When SHAC’s website included links to the tools necessary to carry out virtual
sit-ins, those posts were clearly intended to incite imminent, lawless conduct that was
likely to occur. . . . [an] e-mail titled “Electronic Civil Disobedience,” urged SHAC
supporters to participate in electronic civil disobedience at a specified time. This message encouraged and compelled an imminent, unlawful act that was not only likely to
occur, but provided the schedule by which the unlawful act was to occur.
Id. at 141, 155 (emphasis added). Note that this result does not actually depend on the temporal imminence of the urged conduct, but on the fact that a time was specified at all.
46. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 266–67 (4th Cir. 1997).
47. United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1280 (2d Cir. 1990); see also United States
v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 551–52 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding aiding-and-abetting liability possible even if the speech “spring[s] from the anterior motive to effect political or social
change”).
48. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 410 (2007). Note, however, that because
Morse is in the school context, the Brandenburg test is applied in a somewhat relaxed form.
See id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens criticizes the majority opinion on
the ground “that the message on this banner would actually persuade either the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her behavior is most implausible.” Id. at 444
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reward to anyone “who kills, maims, or seriously injures a member of the
American Nazi Party” at an event five weeks away.49 However, courts
have found lawless activity not to be spatiotemporally imminent where
the speaker(s): posted a list of “Top Twenty Terror Tactics” online;50 led
a Klu Klux Klan (KKK) rally where members were wielding fire arms,
burning a cross, and chanting “bury the niggers” and promising
“revengeance” (this being Brandenburg itself);51 created violent video
games and pornography that purportedly inspired violence in the real
world;52 were fundamentalist preachers who preached that the Bible
commands that Christians must violate truancy laws; 53 published an
article painting autoerotic asphyxiation in glowing terms;54 created
digitally synthesized child pornography;55 created posters celebrating the
killing of abortion doctors and identifying doctors who had not yet been
killed;56 posted personal information combined with racist and
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
49. People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) The court found that
“solicitation of murder in connection with a public event of this notoriety, even though five
weeks away, [could] qualify as incitement to imminent lawless action.” Id. at 493.
50. Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 155–56 (noting the posting and specific lawless activities the
posting could be linked to). In a footnote, the court further noted that “[t]he government [was]
attempt[ing] to connect the posting of the ‘Top Twenty Terror Tactics,’ which occurred on
March 6, 2001, to later unlawful conduct, the earliest of which occurred on March 31, 2001.
These events occurred a minimum of three weeks apart, which does not meet the ‘imminence’
required by the Brandenburg standard.” Id. at 155 n.10.
51. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 n.1, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam).
52. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)
(citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)) (“Even the theory of causation in this case is that persistent exposure to the defendants’ media gradually undermined
Carneal’s moral discomfort with violence to the point that he solved his social disputes with
a gun. This glacial process of personality development is far from the temporal imminence
that we have required to satisfy the Brandenburg test.”); see also Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281 (D. Colo. 2002) (“Plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law,
demonstrate that the video games and movie were ‘likely’ to cause any harm, let alone imminent lawless action.”).
53. Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 576 F. Supp. 1299, 1334 (D. Me. 1983) (quoting
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (“Any action brought against plaintiff pastors,
administrators or church schools for inducing truancy by ‘preaching’ that the Bible commands
fundamentalist Christians to send their children to schools regulated solely by fundamentalist
Christians would certainly ‘restrain orderly discussion and persuasion.’”)).
54. Herceg v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022–23 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Even if the
article paints in glowing terms the pleasures supposedly achieved by the practice it describes,
as the plaintiffs contend, no fair reading of it can make its content advocacy, let alone incitement to engage in the practice.”).
55. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)).
56. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1092 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Under Brandenburg, advocacy can be made illegal if it amounts to incitement. But incitement requires an immediacy
of action that simply does not exist here, which is doubtless why plaintiffs did not premise
their claims on an incitement theory.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated, 422 F.3d 949 (9th
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homophobic rhetoric on white supremacist forums;57 recorded and
released the song “Suicide Solution” advocating suicide;58 called for a
strike in a newspaper advertisement in violation of a court order; 59 sold
books and magazines whose “primary purpose [encouraged] illegal drug
use” at self-identified “head shops”;60 and urged killing a judge on a
public blog61 (if you are a more visually oriented reader, please see the
table in Appendix I).
The odd and contradictory dimensions of this debate are even clearer
when one compares two opposing formulations of the imminence rule as
applied to terrorism:
Imminent: “The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of
methods of terror . . . should be beyond the pale.”62
Not Imminent: “[T]he publication of the ‘Top Twenty Terror Tactics,’
without more, is also protected, because although it lists illegal conduct,
there is no suggestion that [Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC)]
planned to imminently implement these tactics.”63

Note the irony that these cases taken together seemingly offer more
protection to speech online, as in United States v. Fullmer, than in print,
as in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., even as so many commentators
suggest that it is online speech that presents the real problem.64 However,
Cir. 2005).
57. United States v. Henry (In re White), No. 2:07cv342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133148,
at *222 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2013).
58. Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1151 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (citing Noto v. United
States 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1960).
59. Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 12–13, 12 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
60. High Ol’ Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364, 366, 369–70 (N.D. Ga. 1978),
rev’d, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980). “[S]o-called ‘head shops’ tend to include among their
inventories: pipes, rolling papers, drug testing kits and cutting kits, small spoons, ornate
straws, decorative mirrors, tweezers and clips, records, books, magazines, posters, and tapestries.” Id. at 366 n.2.
61. United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131244, at *6–7
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009) (“In the world in which we live, speech has no geographical boundaries. The fact that Defendant issued his statements on his blog rather than in person only
served to ensure that an indefinite audience had access to his remarks, and enlarged the group
of individuals subject to incitement.”), aff’d, 720 F.3d 411, 429 (2d Cir. 2013).
62. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States
v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, J. dissenting)).
63. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2009).
64. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply
in Media Violence Tort Cases?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 15 (2000) (“A legal standard designed
to preserve the right of dissenters to advocate in the abstract the desirability of violence as a
method of social and political change simply bears no strong contextual relationship to disputes involving violent video games, surprise television, violent movies, internet ‘wanted’
posters or murder instruction manuals.”); Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense
Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1145, 1166 (2013) (“The imminent threat of harm test is
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this result makes perfect sense if we consider that traditional print media
are often taken as more authoritative and are more likely to be relied
upon—that is, they are causally closer to the relevant acts of “terror,”
even if the digital speech has both more theoretical reach and shelf life.65
Critically, the formulations here in Fullmer and in Rice simply cannot be
squared; Rice says that certain “teaching” is unprotected because it incites
imminent lawless activity, while Fullmer suggests that a plan to
“implement” the teachings (something the publisher in Rice obviously
did not have) is required to find the imminence necessary to restrain
speech.66 But, enough high level discussion—let us dive into some of the
cases themselves.
In Rice, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
lawless activity to be imminent.67 The court wrestled with a pre-internet
version of the imminence dilemma, addressing a state-law wrongful death
action brought against the publisher (Paladin) of the book “Hit Man,” on
the theory that the publisher should be held liable for a triple murder that
carefully followed instructions found in Hit Man.68 Thinking itself secure
in the spatiotemporal formulation of Brandenburg, Paladin stipulated that
the murderer followed the “instructions from Hit Man . . . in planning,
executing, and attempting to cover up the murders of Mildred and Trevor
Horn and Janice Saunders” and that “it actually intended to provide
assistance to murderers and would-be murderers which would be used by
them ‘upon receipt.’”69 Instead, however, the Rice court refused to bite
the doctrinal bullet, and instead—after a seemingly odd aside noting that
numerous courts had “concluded that the First Amendment is generally
inapplicable to charges of aiding and abetting violations of the tax

too narrow in scope to regulate the dissemination of public threats streaming on the internet.”);
Thomas E. Crocco, Comment, Inciting Terrorism on the Internet: An Application of Brandenburg to Terrorist Websites, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 451, 482 (2004) (“Until terrorism
is removed from the world, there exists a ‘threshold of imminence’ such that the potential for
additional terrorist acts is so great that they must be considered imminent. . . . [T]errorist websites advocating acts intended to destroy our society do not warrant the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
65. See Bayan AlSutari, Which One Has More Influence on Society, Traditional Media
or New Media?, MEDIUM.COM (Nov. 19, 2017), https://medium.com/@bayan.alsutari/whichone-has-more-influence-on-society-traditional-media-or-new-media-2790fad84822.
66. Compare Rice, 128 F.3d at 249, with Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 155.
67. 128 F.3d at 265.
68. Id. at 241.
69. Id. at 241–42. This case might also be explained by the principle that being too clever
does not impress judges at all. See J. Remy Green, All Your Works Are Belong to Us: New
Frontiers for the Derivative Work Right in Video Games, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 393, 431 n.129
(2018) (“This case might also simply be best seen as standing for the principle that being too
clever rarely works out well for anyone.”).
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laws”70—rested its decision on whether the government was attempting
to restrict “advocacy as such.”71 Leaning heavily on pre-Brandenburg
cases, the court found that “detailed, focused instructional assistance to
those contemplating or in the throes of planning murder is the antithesis
of speech protected under Brandenburg.”72
This is classic question begging. That is, to state that the relevant
test is whether the speaker provided “assistance to those . . . in the throes
of planning murder” does not state something different in kind than a test
for imminence, it merely rephrases it.73 Calling back to the metaphors that
Justice Holmes and Judge Hand used, the purported “throes” test is
simply another way of stating that one is not allowed to speak a set of
words into a context that, metaphorically, is the equivalent of tossing a
lighted match into a barrel of gasoline.74 The reformulation the Rice court
engages in does not actually compel the result it reaches—it simply finds
a synonym for the word (imminence) that it finds troublesome. It solves
the problem no more than, say, if I were asked, “What temperature is hot
enough for baking pizza?” And I responded, “Make sure the temperature
is sufficiently warm!”
Thus, application of the test in Rice, just like application of the
unadorned Brandenburg/Hess test, does not compel any different result
in Fullmer75 (on virtually the same facts)—though it is worth noting that
the Fullmer court did find imminent lawless action in other parts of the
speaker’s speech.76 The speech in Fullmer relevant to our purposes is the
posting of a set of “Top Twenty Terror Tactics” on the internet, which
the government linked to later lawless conduct, the “earliest of which
occurred . . . three weeks” after the posting.77 This gap of three weeks is,
of course, far, far shorter than the ten years between the publication of
70. 128 F.3d at 245 (citing United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1985)).
71. Id. at 246 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE
AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS
CONTROLLED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAY BE
SUBJECT
TO
THE
UNITED
STATES
CONSTITUTION
37
(1997),
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/raisethefist/archive/abi.htm).
72. Id. at 249. For the question of whether these older cases should be understood to apply, compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1950) (“The freedom to speak is
not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror . . . should be beyond the pale . . . .”), with
Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 155 (“[T]he publication of the ‘Top Twenty Terror Tactics,’ without
more, is also protected, because although it lists illegal conduct, there is no suggestion that
SHAC planned to imminently implement these tactics.”).
73. Rice, 128 F.3d at 249.
74. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten,
244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
75. 584 F.3d at 156.
76. Id. at 156–58.
77. Id. at 155 n.10.
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Hit Man in 1983 and the murders it inspired on March 3, 1993.78 Yet,
similar to Rice, the government in Fullmer was able to present strong
evidence that the defendants “actually intended to provide assistance to
murderers and would-be murderers which would be used by them ‘upon
receipt.’”79 The website displayed “a series of links dedicated to
educating activists on how to evade investigators” including—as an
example—detailed instructions on how to ensure data security and advice
to use particular applications to do so.80
Similarly (if for perhaps much more pragmatic reasons) courts show
no hesitation in holding that advocacy or incitement of tax evasion (where
it included how-to-type instructions) is absolutely incitement of imminent
lawless activity, regardless of time frame.81 That is, if the speech at issue
is directed at inciting tax fraud—as opposed to, say, murder—courts do
not seem to take into account the temporal relationship between the
speech and the lawless activity at all. Perhaps it is this completely
atemporal approach when it comes to tax revenue that most clearly shows
that courts do not really mean spatiotemporal imminence.82

78. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241 n.2; see also People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488, 493 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (“We think solicitation of murder in connection with a public event of this notoriety, even though five weeks away, can qualify as incitement to imminent lawless action.”).
79. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.
80. Compare Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 140–41 (quoting Joint Appendix at 1512, 3095–99,
Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (Nos. 06-4211, -4296, -4339, -4436, -4437, -4438, -4447) (“In these
sections of the website, SHAC advised its protesters to . . . ‘[b]urn anything with sensitive
information on it . . . . Visit www.pgp.com and download an email encryption program to
protect your email conversations.’ ‘PGP’ stands for ‘pretty good privacy,’ and that encryption
device was generally effective at protecting e-mail conversations from outside monitoring.
PGP is also used to erase data from hard drives. The software was found on eight of the nine
computers at SHAC’s de facto headquarters where three Defendants also lived.”)), with Rice,
128 F.3d at 240 (“Hit Man instructs in ‘explicit detail’ (replete with photographs) how to
construct, ‘without the need of special engineering ability or machine shop tools,’ a homemade, ‘whisper-quiet’ silencer from material available in any hardware store. James Perry
constructed such a homemade silencer and used it on the night that he murdered Mildred and
Trevor Horn and Janice Saunders.”).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1280 (2d Cir. 1990); United States
v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985).
82. See Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 979 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 799 (West 2008)) (“[T]he
nature of the lawless action solicited, bears some relationship to its imminence. Generally
speaking, the more serious the crime the greater its time span. Murder, the most serious crime
of all, carries the longest time span of any crime, as shown by the lack of any time limitation
on its prosecution and a threat of murder can be imminent at a time when a threat of trespass
is not.”). This kind of “sliding scale” imminence test is another possible solution to the incoherence in this area of law, but strikes me as begging for inconsistent and politically problematic application. I mention this here to highlight the fact that courts are finding ways out of a
strict application spatiotemporal imminence all the time.
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II. EXAMINING THE COMMON LAW MODEL
In more recent years, Brandenburg jurisprudence has started to take
on the two critical features of a judicial moment susceptible to common
law innovation: (1) the old regime is no longer workable and (2) though
the courts are ostensibly applying the old rule, they are in reality, slowly
gravitating towards a new rule.83 These qualities are apparent in the
current, spatiotemporal imminence jurisprudence.84
A. MacPherson and the Common Law Model of Innovation
Professor David Strauss describes Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s
decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.85 as a “classic in the common
law canon . . . reflecting common law reasoning in its most sophisticated
form.”86 The MacPherson case found Judge Cardozo, in essence,
throwing out a rule requiring contractual privity for recovery in torts
involving defective products, unless the product was “inherently
dangerous.”87 By the time MacPherson came before Judge Cardozo,

83. See David Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 845, 855–56 (2007); see also THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 5–6 (4th ed. 1962). Kuhn’s theory of scientific change neatly and powerfully
mirrors Strauss’s theory. Kuhn posits a structural distinction within science between “normal
science” that involves research within an existing paradigm and “revolutionary science”
where a crisis emerges after enough anomalies accumulate in the application of normal science, and scientists must explore alternatives to what seem like bedrock assumptions. KUHN,
supra. When and if a paradigm ultimately shifts, scientific history is often recast as presenting
an inevitable process leading to the new paradigm. I owe Kate Walling an intellectual debt
for drawing my attention to this parallel.
84. See Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The Brandenburg Test and Speech that Encourages
or Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 WILMETTE L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (“The test was unnecessary to
the resolution of the Brandenburg case itself, is laced with ambiguity despite its veneer of
clarity, and has received little clarification in the few subsequent Supreme Court cases that
might have shed additional light on its meaning. Lower courts, meanwhile, have, to a very
considerable extent, applied and interpreted it very narrowly.”).
85. 111 N.E. 1050, 1050 (1916).
86. Strauss, supra note 83, at 852; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
161–64 (1985); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9–27 (1949); Karl
Llewellyn, What is the Doctrine of Judicial Precedent, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 209 (1940);
Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Pradjudizienrecht in Amerika, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 205 (1933).
87. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). In a quirk of
this history that is highly convenient for present purposes, some courts used the formulation
“imminently dangerous” acts of negligence, referring to the manufacture of the object, in the
place of “inherently dangerous” object. Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063,
1064 (N.Y. 1909). This is “imminence” in an obviously causal sense; the danger posed by a
defective product placed into the market is neither by necessity temporally or physically proximate at the time of its manufacture. Instead, injury is “imminent” in the sense that the only
remaining causal link between the object and the danger it poses is its normal use. Id. (“[A]
manufacturer may become liable [to third parties having no contractual relation] for a negli-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169952

REMY GREEN FINAL ARTICLE

2019]

6/20/2019 1:33 PM

Digitizing Brandenburg

367

however, the state of the law was a mess. New York appellate courts had
found that poison (when sold as a bottle of medicine),88 a defective
building,89 an elevator,90 a rope supplied to lift heavy goods, 91 a small
bottle of “aerated water,”92 and a large “coffee urn”93 were all inherently
dangerous products, but a flywheel in a machine, a wagon axle, a carriage
wheel,94 and an exploding steam boiler95 were not. Generally speaking,
looking to the cases would suggest that predicting whether a product
would be found to be “inherently dangerous” was more a matter of luck
than application of legal rules.
On its face, MacPherson itself would have seemed comfortably
governed by precedent: if a carriage wheel is not inherently dangerous, 96
surely neither is the wooden wheel of a Buick Runabout as at issue in
MacPherson.97 Since the plaintiff only had privity of contract with Buick,
and the wheel was made by a third party—like with wagon wheels and
axles—the wheel manufacturer should have been immune to liability. 98
Instead, Judge Cardozo used the opportunity that such a supposedly
obvious case presented to make clear that there was, in fact, a new rule
that courts were gravitating to over time:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its
nature gives warning of the consequence to be expected. If to the
element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used
by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
gent construction which, when added to the inherent character of the appliance, makes it imminently dangerous . . . .”).
88. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 410–11 (1852).
89. See Burke v. Ireland, 50 N.Y.S. 369, 372 (App. Div. 1898).
90. See Kahner v. Otis Elevator Co., 89 N.Y.S. 185, 189 (App. Div. 1904), aff’d, 76 N.E.
1097 (N.Y. 1905).
91. See Davies v. Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 20 N.Y.S. 523, 525 (App. Div. 1892), aff’d
mem., 41 N.E. 88 (N.Y. 1895).
92. Torgesen v. Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156, 157, 161 (1908).
93. See Statler, 88 N.E. at 1064–65. As a personal aside, I was recently at my parents’
house where they hosted a post-wedding brunch for my sibling and their now-spouse (congratulations again, Ru & Ben!), and I was shocked—shocked—to find them using inherently
dangerous objects to make coffee! See CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
94. See Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351, 359 (1870).
95. See Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494, 495–97 (1873).
96. Loop, 42 N.Y. at 359 (“If the article is abused by too long use, or by applying too
much weight or speed, an injury may occur, as it may from an ordinary carriage wheel, a
wagon axle, or the common chair in which we sit. . . . That an injury actually occurred by the
breaking of a carriage axle, the failure of the carriage body, the falling to pieces of a chair or
sofa, or the bursting of a fly wheel, does not in the least alter its character [as an object that is
not inherently dangerous].”).
97. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
98. See id.
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irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is
under a duty to make it carefully.99

Put otherwise, Judge Cardozo’s ruling recognized “both [(1)] that the
privity regime with its ‘inherently dangerous’ exception was not
workable and [(2)] that courts, perhaps without being fully aware of what
they were doing, were in fact, although not in name, moving to a simple
foreseeability requirement.”100
Strauss, having made something of a one-man cottage industry of
common law constitutional analysis, provides a far better explanation
than I could craft, so I will offer his words to explain:
The combination of explicitly normative reasoning with a reliance on
the lessons of the past, along with a recognition that both are
indispensable, is what makes MacPherson a common law exemplar.
[Judge] Cardozo did not claim that his views about the privity
requirement were irrelevant; that would have been disingenuous. But
he also did not claim the authority simply to turn those views into law.
Before he could do that, he had to show that his views were consistent
with what other judges had done. The conclusion that the privity regime
was unworkable and should be replaced by foreseeability was not just
[Judge] Cardozo’s alone; it was a conclusion that many judges had
reached, over several decades, even though those judges were not fully
aware that they were reaching that conclusion. [Judge] Cardozo’s
innovation consisted of making that conclusion, which had been
reached inexplicitly in fits and starts, fully explicit.101

Thus, per Strauss, in proposing a causal theory of imminence, I will begin
by “show[ing] that [my] conclusion about the need for change is based
not just on [my] abstract principles but on how the old regime worked—
specifically, how it was already being disregarded, and the new regime
brought into play.”102
B. The Spatiotemporal Imminence Regime is Unworkable, and the
Courts are Already Gravitating Toward Applying a Causal Rule
Strauss’s model of common law constitutional decision making
provides two criteria for identifying an area ripe with common law
innovation: (1) unworkability and (2) gravitation towards an alternate
rule.103 These go hand in hand, to some extent. When a regime is
unworkable, the ostensible rule does not explain or predict cases with any
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1053 (emphasis added).
Strauss, supra note 83, at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 859.
See id. at 857.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169952

REMY GREEN FINAL ARTICLE

2019]

6/20/2019 1:33 PM

Digitizing Brandenburg

369

real reliability, and one might see judges disregarding or avoiding the rule
entirely. Similarly, when there is gravitation towards an alternate rule,
one can predict and explain the cases better with the alternate rule than
with the ostensible rule. Though, obviously, one must allow that some
cases do in fact reach the wrong result—for example, the injury caused
by an exploding steam boiler, for which the plaintiff could not recover
under the privity rule,104 would certainly be compensable under the
MacPherson foreseeability rule.105
As I laid out earlier,106 the current state of imminence law is a
mess.107 Courts find lawless activity to be spatiotemporally imminent or
not in ways where no clear guiding principle can predict results in any
particular case.108 Additionally, there are rare courts that appear to
already be engaged in something like the kind of causal analysis I
propose, without realizing they are applying the “wrong” kind of
imminence.109 Where courts are not explicitly engaging in a struggle with
imminence, however, they create odd and somewhat confusing
exceptions—for instance, take the Rice court’s insistence that providing
“assistance” to someone in the “throes” of lawless action is somehow
different than incitement to imminent lawless action.110 Most relevant to

104. Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494, 495–97 (1873).
105. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.1050, 1053 (1916). At the risk of stating
the obvious: if (1) people occasionally stand near boilers, (2) a negligently constructed boiler
can explode, and (3) those explosions can be big enough to damage significant portions of a
house and kill people, it is foreseeable that a negligently constructed boiler would cause serious injury to people and property. See Losee, 51 N.Y at 496 (“[D]efendants knew at the time
that it was to be used in the immediate vicinity of and adjacent to dwelling-houses and stores
in a village, so that, in case of an explosion while in use, it would be likely to be destructive
to human life and adjacent property, and that, in consequence of the negligence of the said
defendants in the improper construction of the boiler, the explosion that took place occurred[,] . . . damag[ing] the . . . property [and killing two people].”).
106. See discussion supra Section I.B.
107. See generally Michael J. Sherman, Brandenburg v. Twitter, 28 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 127 (2018) (reviewing various approaches to Brandenburg, as well as the calls to
change its rule based on unequal applications by courts).
108. See cases cited infra Appendix I.
109. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1199 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“At best, the scientific evidence concerning the causal relationship between pornographic
materials and violent actions is ambiguous and unvalidated. Such equivocal evidence is insufficient to establish the ‘clear and present danger’ required in order for any of the exceptions
to general [F]irst [A]mendment principles to apply.”); see also State v. Holland, No. CR-9553, 1995 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 930, at *16 (D. Mont. Nov. 8, 1995) (“Immediacy in time of
result cannot be the entire test. . . . ‘Imminent’ harm means a result that is highly predictable.”).
110. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Thomas
A. Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 660–61 (2009)
(arguing that courts are backing away from Brandenburg while still claiming to adhere to it);
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glean from these odd exceptions is that we can see that Strauss’s second
criteria—the gravitational pull of a new rule—is satisfied by courts
contorting to avoid the spatiotemporal rule.111
Thus, I propose that the best (and most consistent with the
underlying justifications for the First Amendment) way of synthesizing
precedent and applying Brandenburg going forward is to use a rule that
turns on causal imminence, rather than spatiotemporal imminence.
III. TOWARD A CAUSAL THEORY
Legal scholar Elizabeth Joh and radio host Roman Mars have
perhaps taken the best approach to the modern constitutional era in
“tak[ing] the actions and tweets of the chief executive of the United States
and channel[ing] that into learning our Constitution like we never have
before.”112 This maxim is no less applicable to the First Amendment than
any other. Thus, while plenty of white supremacists and their ilk have
previously engaged in plenty of speech online, never before have we had
the kind of data about the effects of such speech than we do now with our
current Republican President.113 A recent study found a robust correlation
between the consumption and reach of the 45th President’s Islamophobic
tweets and increases in anti-Muslim hate crimes, and suggested the
connection cannot be easily explained without causation.114 The point of
all this, of course, is that we now know that certain speech online in fact
results in lawless activity.115 Courts already have tacitly recognized this
in cases like Rice.116 What is left is the question of what an alternative
would look like.
Sherman, supra note 107, at 135 (“[O]ne option for the government in addressing online terrorist recruitment is simply to hope that courts will continue to be less than faithful to Brandenburg.”).
111. See Strauss, supra note 83, at 856.
112. The Spending Clause, WHAT TRUMP CAN TEACH US ABOUT CON LAW (June 29,
2017), https://trumpconlaw.com (00:1:15–00:01:30).
113. See generally Müller & Schwarz, supra note 3 (suggesting a correlation between President Trump’s tweets and increased hate-crimes using multiple figures and correlations).
114. See id. at 14 (“[T]he Muslim tweets explain between 13.5 and around 16% of the
weekly variation in anti-Muslim attacks in counties with high Twitter usage, depending on
whether we use the median, top quartile, or top decile in the Twitter user to population ratio.
The tweets only explain between 0 and 10% where fewer people use Twitter. Taken at face
value, this further points to a potential role for social media in enabling hate crimes against
Muslims in the United States.”).
115. See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that
although lawless activity was not imminent, lawless activity was result of internet communications).
116. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 266–67 (suggesting that the jury could
find material in a book providing detailed instructions on how to carry out a crime could lead
to the carrying out of the crime).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169952

REMY GREEN FINAL ARTICLE

2019]

6/20/2019 1:33 PM

Digitizing Brandenburg

371

First, I argue that that the underlying theory and justification for the
First Amendment better fits my causal theory than it does with the
spatiotemporal regime. Second, I provide two potential models here,
based on two other places where causation shows up in American
jurisprudence: causation as applied in tort law and a particular difficult
question posed by entrapment law.117 Finally, I discuss some
developments in the world that clearly fall within the scope of my theory.
A. The Underlying First Amendment Theory and Justification
Few metaphors loom as large in American jurisprudence as the socalled “marketplace of ideas” (the “Marketplace”) does in free-speech.118
Coined by Justice Holmes (joined by Justice Louis Brandeis), and having
intellectual roots in the work of John Stuart Mill,119 the Marketplace
theory of speech basically provides that, like superior products in a
perfect market for goods, given enough time, better ideas and truth will
win out over bad ideas and lies because they represent a better value for
consumers.120 As Justice Brandeis put it, “If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not

117. Obviously, these are not the only potentially fruitful areas of law to borrow from, and
there are any number of other areas I considered. One idea in particular that I found interesting, but ultimately decided would raise too many complications, was using the inchoate crime
tools available in criminal law (i.e., attempt and conspiracy).
118. See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 824–
25 (2008) (“Free speech, in Justice Holmes’s framework, is worthy of constitutional protection precisely because—like the free flow of goods and services—it creates a competitive
environment in which good ideas flourish and bad ideas fail. This theory provided the first
justification for a broad freedom of expression commensurate with the sweeping language of
the First Amendment itself. Never before or since has a Justice conceived a metaphor that has
done so much to change the way that courts, lawyers, and the public understand an entire area
of constitutional law.”); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1965) (“[T]here is undeniably a genuine, though partial, validity in the dictum
that ‘the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market.’ . . . [T]hat test of truth is not merely the ‘best’ test. There is no other.”); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30
GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In Speech Clause jurisprudence, for example, the oft-repeated metaphor that the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to ultimately
prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”).
119. See Blocher, supra note 118, at 823–24 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting)); Beth A. Fagan, Note, Rice v. Paladin Enterprises:
Why Hit Man Is beyond the Pale, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 603, 620 n.137 (2000) (“[Justice]
Holmes’s theory is grounded in the works of John Stuart Mill, who had written that limiting
expression was tantamount to ‘robbing the human race.’”) (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 24 (Oxford Univ. Press 1960) (1859)).
120. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting); see also Blocher, supra note
118, at 823.
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enforced silence.”121 While there are many philosophical justifications for
free speech protections, it seems uncontroversial to assert that
preservation of some version of the Marketplace is inevitably part of that
calculus.122 So, the question becomes: does a causal theory impermissibly
disrupt the functioning of the Marketplace?
Let us begin with this: why is Brandenburg permitted to disrupt the
Marketplace at all? Carrying Justice Brandeis’s conception in Whitney v.
California forward (in general, the solution to speech-based evils is more
speech), the reasoning for allowing Brandenburg-type interventions in
the Marketplace is because in certain cases there is not “time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies.”123 But “time” as Justice
Brandeis uses it here is a heuristic—it stands in for the times when there
is market failure.
Just like in an economic market, the Marketplace for ideas is subject
to market failure.124 In economic markets, there are a number of solutions
for this kind of failure; to achieve efficient outcomes, 125 “one must . . .
explore non-market alternatives.”126 That is, in adopting the metaphor of
a market, for speech, the Justice Brandeis view simultaneously
121. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) (emphasis
added). See generally NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE
SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP (2018) (discussing the difficulties in drafting effective hate-speech
legislation and alternative approaches to censorship).
122. Of course, some scholars state things less equivocally than I am comfortable. See,
e.g., Fagan, supra note 119, at 620 (“The major rationales for protecting free speech are the
(1) marketplace of ideas, (2) self-governance, (3) tolerance, (4) social stability and interest
accommodation, and (5) self-realization theories. Hit Man lacks First Amendment value because none of the justifications underlying the freedom of speech encompass such a manual.”).
123. 274 U.S. at 377.
124. See John O. Ledyard, Market Failure, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 303 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“Market failure, the inefficient allocation of resources with markets, can occur if there are too few markets,
non-competitive behavior, or non-existence problems. Many suggested solutions for market
failure, such as tax-subsidy schemes, property rights assignments, and special pricing arrangements, are simply devices for the creation of more markets. If this can be done in a way that
avoids non-convexities and ensures depth of participation, then the remedy can be beneficial[,] and the new allocation should be efficient. On the other hand, if the addition of markets
creates either non-convexities or shallow participation, then attempts to cure market failure
from too few markets will simply lead to market failure from monopolistic behavior. Market
failure in this latter situation is fundamental. Examples are natural monopolies, external diseconomies, public goods, and informational monopolies. If one wants to achieve efficient allocations of resources in the presence of such fundamental failures one must accept self-interested behavior and explore non-market alternatives.”).
125. Markets are generally favored for their ability to produce efficient outcomes essentially automatically (e.g., by operation of the “invisible hand”). If a market for ideas fails to
produce efficient outcomes, it is not of value qua being a market.
126. Ledyard, supra note 124, at 303.
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acknowledges the possibility of market failure in the Marketplace
implicitly. In economic terms, then, certain speech—in particular, Nazi
and White Supremacist speech127—functions metaphorically as anticompetitive behavior and should be treated as such.
Indeed, philosopher Karl Popper, though speaking in non-economic
terms, identified one such market inefficiency as the “paradox of
tolerance.”128 That paradox runs as follows:
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we
extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are
not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the
intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with
them.—In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should
always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we
can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by
public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we
should claim the right to suppress them, if necessary even by force; for
it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level
of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may
forbid their followers to listen to rational argument because it is
deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists
or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right
not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement
preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should
consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the
same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping;
or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal.129

Popper recognizes the monopolistic tendency of certain ideas in the
Marketplace. Much like monopolistic behavior, while perhaps innocuous
when engaged in on a small scale, if permitted with any significant market
share, it will—over time—destroy the very existence of a market and any
concomitant benefits.130
127. A full treatment of this subject would be fascinating and—I think—very effective,
but I fear this Article is already risking losing your attention, dear reader. Thus, I will save
questions about something like a Sherman Act for free speech for another day. See generally
Andre L. Smith, Race, Law, and the Free Market: A Critical Law and Economics Conception
of Racism as Asymmetrical Market Failure, 4 GEO L.J. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 39 (2012)
(exploring conceptualizing racism itself as a kind of market failure in actual economic markets).
128. See KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 546 (1950); see also Julia
Serano, Free Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance, MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2017), https://medium.com/@juliaserano/free-speech-and-the-paradox-of-tolerance-e0547aefe538.
129. POPPER, supra note 128, at 546 (second emphasis added).
130. See Roger Congleton et al., Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking: An Overview,
RESEARCHGATE
33
(Jan.
2008),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242084700_Forty_Years_of_Research_on_Rent_Seeking_An_Overview. See generally
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We might, similarly, regard any of the harms that white supremacist
speech and incitement causes as rents sought or monopoly profits
extracted. Further, the analogy between how a monopolist erects barriers
to entry in a market131 and how neo-nazis harass minorities and those who
disagree with them on the internet is striking. By way of illustrative
example, take the so-called “GamerGate” mob that attacked video game
developer Zoë Quinn.132 In short, after breaking up with a man she dubs
“The Ex,” he posted a “Manifesto” in which he “bragged about how he
designed the Manifesto to exploit the key things that make online content
go viral . . . .”133 Quinn’s harassment persists to this day, beginning
with—in Quinn’s words—
[t]housands of people . . . latching on to me as a stand-in for any number
of things they hated. The places where I sold my games, talked with
friends, or even just looked at cute cat videos were suddenly awash in
pictures of mutilated bodies, images of horrible violence, and threats to
do these things and worse to me. My home address and phone number
were discovered and distributed, leading to 5 a.m. phone calls from
strangers detailing the ways they planned to rape me and people
bragging about leaving dead animals in my mailbox. Nude photos of
me were dug up, printed out, jizzed on by strangers, and mailed to
colleagues, friends, and family.134

The purpose of these actions, of course, was to silence and eliminate
dissenting views. Per Quinn, “As my ex’s manifesto went viral, it became
obvious that my attackers’ dream was to get me to stop ‘feeding the trolls’

Keith Cowling and Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 ECON. J. 727
(1978) (arguing based on data that the social costs of monopolistic profit extraction by firms
in economic markets in the United States and United Kingdom are extremely high).
131. See R. Preston McAfee et al., What is a Barrier to Entry?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 461,
461 (2004) (collecting definitions of entry barriers for antitrust purposes).
132. See generally ZOË QUINN, CRASH OVERRIDE: HOW GAMERGATE (NEARLY)
DESTROYED MY LIFE, AND HOW WE CAN WIN THE FIGHT AGAINST ONLINE HATE (2017) (recounting Quinn’s entire experience, as well as her career of activism that grew out of the
experience, and the various advocacy campaigns she has been involved with).
133. Id. at 51.
134. Id. at 2–3. I also want to note that, by discussing what happened to Quinn herself, I
am guilty of much the same sin many media outlets committed in covering GamerGate—per
Quinn, “[E]ven in interviews in which I specifically mentioned the people of color and trans
women who had been targeted, those parts of the interview often ended up on the cuttingroom floor. Piece after piece glossed over the other forms of bigotry that were manifested in
the attacks, along with the [name GamerGate’s] roots in domestic violence.” Id. at 73. I chose
to discuss Quinn’s story as she has published it and has become a public figure on the issue,
but I do not want to simply gloss over the insight Quinn offers on the coinciding systems of
oppression often at work in internet incitement and harassment. But see id. (emphasis added)
(“Even when conversations give a nod to intersecting identities, the topic is still relegated to
the sidelines and footnotes.”).
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and shut up. They didn’t want to tease me; they wanted me gone.”135 Even
those who might theoretically speak in support of—or even stay silent
about—Quinn were implicitly threatened: “Anyone to whom I had public
ties began to receive nude photos of me and pressure to publicly denounce
me or become their next target.”136
By publishing Quinn’s address, name, telephone number, and other
details, those engaged in purportedly protected speech137 in fact forced
Quinn out of the Marketplace altogether. In short, as Karl Popper
suggests, certain forms of “incitement” in fact undercut the good
functioning of the Marketplace in the first instance.138 Thus, the
Marketplace-based rationale for protecting speech does not work here; if
this were an ordinary economic market, such monopolistic behavior
would not be permitted.139
B. Proximate and Imminent Causation in Tort Law
Tort law analysis of proximate cause provides one model for how
causal imminence might be analyzed. While, of course, tort causation can
itself be fraught and controversial,140 that causation is part of the prima
135. QUINN, supra note 132, at 51.
136. Id.
137. After Quinn “obtained an abuse prevention order against her ex-boyfriend” that included “a provision restricting [the ex]’s ability to post information about Quinn online,” the
ex appealed, and because the appeal was “in fact exacerbating” ongoing harassment, Quinn
sought vacatur of the abuse prevention order in its entirety. Quinn v. Gjoni, 50 N.E.3d 448,
449–50 (2016). Despite this, the ex continued to press First Amendment issues on the appeal,
arguing that the order “not to post any further information about Quinn or her personal life
online or to encourage ‘hate mobs’” violated his “First Amendment right to comment about
her,” and that the court should reach the issues despite his already having all the relief he
could ask for “because they present issues that are ‘of public importance, capable of repetition,
yet evading review.’” Id. at 449, 449 n.2, 452 (quoting Superintendent of Worcester State
Hosp. v. Hagberg, 372 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Mass. 1978)).
138. POPPER, supra note 128, at 546.
139. Recognizing the monopolistic nature of such behavior also serves to clarify the flaw
in what might be called “reverse discrimination” or “reverse hate speech” cases. Where power
over the Marketplace has not and does not historically exist, just as finding a Sherman Act
violation by a small, historically marginal firm would be extremely difficult, the market failure rational for restricting speech does not apply. See, e.g., Nico Lang, French Hate Crime
Ruling Sets a Dangerous Precedent for LGBT People: It’s Now Illegal to Call Someone a
“Homophobe” in France, SALON (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.salon.com/2016/11/07/frenchhate-crime-ruling-sets-a-dangerous-precedent-for-lgbt-people-it-is-now-illegal-to-call-someone-a-homophobe-in-france/.
140. See, e.g., Note, Rethinking Actual Causation in Tort Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2163,
2164–65 (2017) (“[I]nquiries into the nature of proximate causation are difficult, in part because of the thorny moral issues they raise and the byzantine exercises in line drawing they
require. . . . [T]his Note seeks to depart from mainstream acceptance of but-for causation and
to explore possible alternatives.”); see also Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838 (1996)
(“It is true that commentators have often lamented the degree of disagreement regarding the
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facie case for nearly all torts, and courts seem plenty well able to go about
deciding tort cases suggesting that causal analysis in torts is functional.
Stated concisely, the test for proximate cause is two-part: “An act is
a proximate cause of an injury if [(1)] it was a substantial factor in
bringing about that injury, and if [(2)] the injury was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s act.”141
We are not just limited to importing the general causal test; in a
serendipitous quirk, many of the New York tort cases discussed supra in
Part II.A (the line of cases leading to MacPherson) actually apply an
“imminence” test in discussing causal relationships.142 Recall that these
cases are drawn out of the evolution of tort law from requiring privity of
contract in cases alleging negligent construction of a product to requiring
injuries be foreseeable.143 In New York, these cases often, instead of
discussing the inherent dangerousness of a particular article, discussed
imminence of a danger to human life.144 Thus, as in the paradigm case of
Thomas v. Winchester, where negligent replacement of an apothecary’s
dandelion extract with highly poisonous belladonna was found to create
imminent danger, if a plaintiff could prove danger to life was “imminent”
in the causal sense, then she was entitled to an exception to the general
privity regime.145 Similarly, imminence was found when “death or great
bodily harm of some person was the natural and almost inevitable
consequence of” the negligent action—for instance, “the sale of
principles of proximate causation and confusion in the doctrine’s application . . . .”); Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“What we
do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough
sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.
This is not logic. It is practical politics.”); Ned Hall, The Intrinsic Character of Causation, in
1 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS 255 (Dean W. Zimmerman ed., 2004) (discussing causation from a physical perspective).
141. 5 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIV. P. 87.03 (2018). For application of the twopart proximate cause test, see Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1082–83 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that the complaint stated a cause of action where it alleged a city’s deliberate
indifference to maintenance, training, and control of its SWAT teams was the proximate cause
of injury caused by violation of SWAT team member’s constitutional rights).
142. See Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 477 (1882) (finding harm is imminent as to construction workers where defendant negligently constructed a ninety-foot scaffold); Kahner v.
Otis Elevator Co., 89 N.Y.S. 185, 187 (App. Div. 1904), aff’d, 76 N.E. 1097 (N.Y. 1905)
(finding harm is imminent where a large, heavy wheel in an elevator shaft is constructed so
that it falls when someone pulls on a rope that would be pulled on in the ordinary course of
maintenance).
143. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916); Statler v.
George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064–65 (N.Y. 1909); Devlin, 89 N.Y. at 477;
Kahner, 89 N.Y.S. at 187–88.
144. E.g., Devlin, 89 N.Y. at 477; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409–10 (1852);
Kahner, 89 N.Y.S. at 189.
145. See Thomas, 6 N.Y. at 405, 409–10.
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[poisonous] belladonna by means of the false label.”146 In the case of
belladonna, even if there were an enormous gap in time and space
between a doctor’s purchase of what he thought was dandelion extract (a
mild medicine) and his administration of belladonna (a deadly poison) in
its place, the entire time, the mislabeled canister was simply waiting to
cause its harm.
Similarly, then, it should not matter that Hit Man had sat apparently
harmless on a shelf for ten years after its publication (likely spatially far
away from where it was initially written) before it provided the blueprint
to a gruesome triple murder in 1993, because the harm was imminent in
the nature of the book.147 Taking as a model these early twentieth century
tort cases, courts could easily apply a test for whether a particular instance
of online speech created an imminent—that is, inherent to the speech—
risk of lawless activity. While there is obviously some case-by-case work
to be done here, the general principle seems sound. In cases where a
speaker has a large platform and speaks to an audience likely to act on
particular information, the speaker should not have a First Amendment
defense if those acts are likely to be unlawful unless counterspeech can
effectively protect potential victims. By contrast, if the speaker is, say,
telling jokes on forum where jokes are well-understood as such, the
speaker should have a First Amendment defense to harm caused by a
listener who takes a joke out of context. In practice, I believe this test
would be applied functionally like the concepts discussed below in
Section III.C.
C. Judge Posner’s Entrapment Machine
Thanks in part to his talent for farfetched hypotheticals and flare for

146. Id. at 409.
147. I, of course, should note that my approach does protect less speech than a rigorously
applied spatiotemporal imminence rule. However, it is clear that courts are profoundly uncomfortable with applying a rigorous spatiotemporal rule (and are not, in fact, applying one).
See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997). Thus, I think the fair
comparison is not whether my approach protects less speech than a rigorously applied spatiotemporal rule, but whether it protects less speech than an arbitrary, ad hoc semi-spatiotemporal rule. Moreover, as I argue infra Section III.A, I believe my approach squares well with
the underlying philosophical and normative justifications for the First Amendment.
In short, I think there is room in my causal approach to make any particular policy choice a
question of drawing lines than one of principle without losing sight of the fact that a causal
test also does a better job of capturing the intuitions and concerns actually at work in the cases.
In the interest of being clear and putting my cards on the table, however, I should note my
own policy intuition is that—in particular for “revenge porn,” doxing, white supremacist and
racist rhetoric, and a variety of other toxic internet speech—our current jurisprudence (to the
extent it is consistent at all) is generally too speech protective.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169952

REMY GREEN FINAL ARTICLE

378

6/20/2019 1:33 PM

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 69:351

dramatic, compelling writing, former U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s opinions provide a rich source of
material testing the limits and internal logic of a variety of areas of law.
A causal test for imminence might look a lot like the limit to entrapment
suggested by a hypothetical in an entrapment case, where Judge Posner
fictionalizes a machine that left only the act of pushing a button for the
defendant to have committed a crime:
Suppose the government went to someone and asked him whether he
would like to make money as a counterfeiter, and the reply was, “Sure,
but I don’t know anything about counterfeiting.” Suppose the
government then bought him a printer, paper, and ink, showed him how
to make the counterfeit money, hired a staff for him, and got everything
set up so that all he had to do was press a button to print the money;
and then offered him $10,000 for some quantity of counterfeit bills. The
government’s lawyer acknowledged that the counterfeiter would have
a strong case that he had been entrapped, even though he was perfectly
willing to commit the crime once the government planted the suggestion
and showed him how and the government neither threatened him nor
offered him an overwhelming inducement.
....
. . . It is different when the defendant is not in a position without the
government’s help to become involved in illegal activity. “The
government may not provoke or create a crime, and then punish the
criminal, its creature.”148

Judge Posner’s hypothetical is largely getting at the fact that, in
some entrapment cases, the government is the real reason any criminal
activity takes place.149 Without the government acting, there is no reason
to believe the idea of counterfeiting would have occurred to the
defendant.150 Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, it is difficult to
assign the blame to the actor as opposed to the government.151 Indeed, if
such an entrapment machine were set up, say, at a farmer’s market with
an agent offering the $10,000 for anyone who pushed the button and
handed him the counterfeit bills, one imagines they would find a near
endless supply of willing “counterfeiters.”152
Understood that way, Judge Posner’s entrapment machine looks

148. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199–200 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(emphasis added) (quoting Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1199.
151. See id. at 1201–02.
152. See id. at 1199.
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very similar to how the internet functions in the cases where personal
information and justifications for violence are posted to forums online.
The speaker (the person posting the information) makes it relatively
simple for any passing user to participate in a campaign of violence and
harassment, and by doing so, creates lawless action where it would not
otherwise exist. For example, in Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, where
the speaker created “wanted” posters online that identified individual
doctors and indicated which doctors had already been killed (encouraging
violence against the others), without the action of the Nuremberg Files
website, no one would be “in a position” to identify and attempt to murder
the doctors listed.153 Thus, where the speaker’s speech is the very thing
that creates the ability to engage in the relevant lawless act, the natural
effects of that speech should be understood as causally imminent to it: the
speaker has effectively created a “lawless action” machine (to use
Brandenburg’s language).154
The internet is, in effect, a lawless action machine. There are places
on the internet where one need only enter a name and a few personal
details and press “post” in order to set a real-life chain of events in motion
that leads to constant harassment and people showing up at a person’s
door or demanding extortion payments for years. In one case detailed by
Professor Danielle Citron in her seminal book Hate Crimes in Cyber
Space, a woman’s ex-boyfriend pressed the button on the lawless action
machine, as it were, by posting “her full name, e-mail address, screen
shots of her Facebook page, and links to her web bio, which included her
work address” online alongside nude pictures of her that he had obtained
during their relationship.155 From there, “countless anonymous emails”
began pouring in, “claim[ing] that her pictures and videos aroused [the
senders] and that they could not wait to have sex with her.”156 Her work
colleagues began to receive anonymous “tips,” including a phone call to
the university where she taught accusing her of “masturbating for her
students and putting it online.”157 This harassment continued through
name and email changes, and was in full force years after the original
posts.158 Nothing at all could have happened, however, if the ex-boyfriend

153. See 290 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated, 422
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005).
154. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
155. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 45 (2014)
156. Id.
157. Id. at 46.
158. See id. at 45–50.
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did not press the button.159 It is therefore at that point—when the exboyfriend’s finger is hanging over the button—that the lawless activity
should be considered “imminent.”160 In understanding this unique quality
of cyberspace, we can perhaps draw on something like internet folk
wisdom.161 “Rule 34” of the internet “states that pornography or sexually
related material exists for any conceivable subject.”162 Its corollary,
called either “Rule 34b” or “Rule 35,” provides that if no pornography
exists, it will be made.163 Thus, together, the rules
suggest that if you can think of a pornographic scenario, theme, or
style—no matter how esoteric or unlikely it may seem—then such porn
will already have been made, and it will be available online. If this is
not the case, then it is only a matter of time before such porn is made.164

The applicability of these rules here is a little tamer, but is driven by
the same force—what one might call the “infinite monkey” quality of the
internet.165 That is, while not infinite in some real sense, the raw humanpower of the internet makes it so that, if the only causal step left is
equivalent to pressing a button, someone is inevitably going to press that
button.166 So, for example, during the so-called “GamerGate,” various
fora were used to publish personal details of women who played and

159. See, e.g., United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199–200 (7th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (“Suppose the government went to someone and asked him whether he would like to
make money as a counterfeiter, and the reply was, ‘Sure, but I don’t know anything about
counterfeiting.’ Suppose the government then bought him a printer, paper, and ink, showed
him how to make the counterfeit money, hired a staff for him, and got everything set up so
that all he had to do was press a button to print the money; and then offered him $10,000 for
some quantity of counterfeit bills. . . . [T]he counterfeiter would have a strong case that he
had been entrapped, even though he was perfectly willing to commit the crime once the government planted the suggestion and showed him how . . . .”).
160. Imminent (adj.), supra note 14. Recall, the meaning of minēre draws upon words
meaning “mountain,” and archaically it means “overhanging.” See id.
161. Admittedly, “folk wisdom” is a generous characterization.
162. Nukeitall, Rule 34, URBAN DICTIONARY (Mar. 30, 2006), https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Rule%2034; see also OGI OGAS & SAI GADDAM, A BILLION
WICKED THOUGHTS 7 (2011) (“Today, Rule 34 thrives as sacred lore on blogs, YouTube videos, Twitter feeds and social networking sites. It’s frequently used as a verb, as in ‘I Rule
34’ed Paula Abdul and Simon Cowell on the judging table.’”).
163. Durking, Rule 34, URBAN DICTIONARY (July 6, 2008), https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Rule%2034.
164. SUSANNA PAASONEN, CARNAL RESONANCE: AFFECT AND ONLINE PORNOGRAPHY 1
(2011).
165. See JORGE LUIS BORGES, THE TOTAL LIBRARY 214–16 (Eliot Weiberger ed., Esther
Allen et al. trans., 2017) (collecting various versions of the infinite monkey concept). “Strictly
speaking, one immortal monkey would suffice.” Id. at 215 n.2
166. See, e.g., Obama Makes It Through Another Day of Resisting Urge to Launch All U.S.
Nuclear Weapons at Once, ONION (May 11, 2011, 8:00 AM), https://politics.theonion.com/obama-makes-it-through-another-day-of-resisting-urge-to-1819572627.
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critiqued videogames.167 This practice, known as “doxing,” involves
placing enough information online that an angered mob can terrorize an
individual.168 Doxing is effective as a mode of terror because it can be
particularly difficult to attribute the aggregate effect of the various
anonymous actors on the internet to any one person.169
What makes doxing effective in this way is its ability to leverage the
infinite monkey-like qualities of the internet. That is, the person whose
intent, malice, and access to personal information makes accomplishing
terror possible has a relatively easy time setting the machine in motion.
While my causal test is far from solving the myriad problems presented
by doxing and revenge porn,170 it removes a particularly high hurdle—
the First Amendment—that scholars in the area have (to mix sports
metaphors) wrestled with. A causal understanding of First Amendment
imminence allows a court to look at the person pressing the button that
sets the activity in motion, no matter how far removed that person is in
space and time. Thus, the “causal machine” test might be stated as where
the speech at issue provides enough that the ultimate actor (the person in
fact doing the “lawless” action that is made imminent) would otherwise
“not [be] in a position without the [speaker]’s help to become involved
in [lawless] activity”171—that lawless activity is best understood as being
causally imminent in relation to the speech. As applied to the revenge
167. Julia M. MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy for the Malicious Publication of Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2459 (2017) (discussing Gamergate, and further addressing the First Amendment implications of threat doctrine,
rather than imminence, for doxing).
168. Sometimes referred to as “doxxing,” “dox,” short for “documents” or “docs,” is used
as a verb meaning to publish someone’s personal identity documents or information online
without that person’s permission or consent. See dox, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox.
169. See MacAllister, supra note 167 (“The subjects of Gamergate harassment, like Brianna Wu endured a constant barrage of harassment that affected their ability to work, socialize, and sleep. Writer and developer Zoë Quinn fled her home after people online made rape
and death threats toward her and bragged about putting dead animals through her mailbox.
Feminist cultural critic Anita Sarkeesian canceled a talk at Utah State University after the
university administration received an email that a shooting massacre would be carried out at
the event.”). It is also important to note the counter-First Amendment values that such attacks
have: “[T]he [Gamergate] actors doxed them with the intent to intimidate, harass, silence, and
threaten them.” Id.
170. Mary Anne Franks provides a deeper analysis of the First Amendment and revenge
porn. See Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA.
L. REV. 1251, 1312–13 (2017) (“It is not implausible that a court could treat nonconsensual
pornography as belonging to an existing and explicit category of exception to full First
Amendment protection. Even if it does not however, nonconsensual pornography could still
be considered a category of speech that is an implicit exception to the First Amendment, or
as a new category of exception.”).
171. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 2000 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (emphasis added).
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porn and doxing examples, the spatiotemporal approach presents
difficulty in that the true harm—the “countless anonymous emails,” the
“anonymous tips,” and the real-world violence—is not the harm that
happens in a short temporal time frame. Thus, while there may be some
short-term dignitary harm172 to the initial posting, some of the truly bad
conduct is never captured by the spatiotemporal test. By contrast, the
causal test easily includes all subsequent conduct that makes use of the
“revenge porn” or dox posting; if not for the initial post, no subsequent
harms would emerge.
D. Applying Causal Theory to Modern Problems
On June 28, 2018, a shooter173 armed with a shotgun and smoke
grenades attacked the newsroom of Maryland’s Capital News Gazette,
killing five reporters.174 Just two days before the shooting, neo-fascist
tabloid writer Milo Yiannopoulos sent two different journalists messages
saying, “I can’t wait for the vigilante squads to start gunning journalists
down on sight.”175 He then reposted these messages publicly on his
Instagram account, captioning the message “where is the lie[?]” 176 The
post received over 7,000 “likes” before Yiannopoulos took it down.177
172. But see generally J. Remy Green, A (Nude) Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words—But
How Many Dollars?: Using Copyright as a Metric for Harm in “Revenge Porn” Cases, 45
RUTGERS L. REC. 171 (2018) (arguing that a better conception of the harm in “revenge porn”
cases is in terms of copyright harm). If the harm of “revenge porn” is seen as a copyright-type
harm, rather than a dignitary kind of harm, the very publication of the thing might more readily be seen as causally encompassing any and all subsequent causal links.
173. Name omitted on principle. I will note, however, his gender (male), his race (white),
that he had a history of domestic violence, and that he was arrested alive.
174. See Sabrina Tavernise et al., 5 People Dead in Shooting at Maryland’s Capital Gazette Newsroom, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/capital-gazette-annapolis-shooting.html.
175. Davis Richardson, How the Upper East Side’s Beach Café Became a Watering Hole
for Trump Titans, OBSERVER (June 28, 2018, 2:39 PM), https://observer.com/2018/06/beachcafe-trump-titans-watering-hole/ (“Following [President] Trump’s presidential upset, former
members of the president’s inner-circle . . . flocked to the Beach [Café] to flex their political
capital and hash out resentments from the campaign trail. . . . [The café also drew the] occasional fringe grifters like Alex Jones and Milo Yiannopoulos—the latter of whom told Observer ‘I can’t wait for the vigilante squads to start gunning journalists down on sight’ when
asked about his favorite item on the menu . . . .”); Will Sommer, Far-Right YouTube Star
Plans Takeover of UKIP, DAILY BEAST (June 26, 2018, 5:06 AM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/far-right-youtube-stars-plan-takeover-of-ukip (“Asked about
his decision to join the party, Yiannopoulos wrote in an email that he ‘can’t wait for the vigilante squads to start gunning journalists down on sight!’”).
176. Davis Richardson, Milo Yiannopoulos Encourages Vigilantes to Start ‘Gunning Journalists Down,’ OBSERVER (June 26, 2018, 12:32 PM), https://observer.com/2018/06/miloyiannopoulos-encourages-vigilantes-start-gunning-journalists-down/.
177. Joe Bernstein (@Bernstein), TWITTER (June 27, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://twitter.com/bernstein/status/1011987091658543104?lang=en (“A reader tells me he reported
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Almost immediately after the news broke, Yiannopoulos posted a several
paragraph rant on Facebook, which notably began, “You’re about to see
a raft of news stories claiming that I am responsible for inspiring the
deaths of journalists.”178 President Donald Trump, too, has consistently
made comments that seem to encourage violence against journalists.179
He has called them “sick people” who are “trying to take away our history
and our heritage,” and has said, “I really think [journalists do not] like
our country.”180 He also—in Stalinesque fashion—frequently calls the
media “the enemy of the people.”181 In the aftermath of the shooting,
Milo’s @instagram post threatening journalists with gun violence, and the company found it
did not violate their community guidelines.”).
178. Milo posted his “You’re about to see” post at 4:05 p.m., less than two hours after the
shooting took place, and at most, no more than an hour after fatalities were reported. Milo
Yiannopoulos, FACEBOOK (June 28, 2018, 4:05 PM), https://www.facebook.com/myiannopoulos/posts/youre-about-to-see-a-raft-of-news-stories-claiming-that-i-am-responsiblefor-ins/1194490660688827/. This timing indicates that he knew, immediately, that his prior
public comments could be read to have encouraged the shooting. The shooter entered the
room around 2:30 p.m., and the newspaper staff tweeted asking for help at 2:43 p.m. Anthony
Messenger (@amesscapgaz), TWITTER (June 28, 2018, 2:43 PM), https://twitter.com/amesscapgaz/status/1012406073704239105. At 3:45 p.m., reporter Phil Davis reported, “A single shooter, shot multiple people at my office, some of whom are dead.” Phil
Davis (@PhilDavis_CG), TWITTER (June 28, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://twitter.com/phildavis_cg/status/1012421008597364742?lang=en.
179. See President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (July 2, 2017, 8:21
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/881503147168071680 (featuring a video
of President Trump’s appearance on WWE, body-slamming a wrestler with a face that has
been edited and replaced to show a CNN logo instead); see also President Donald Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 19, 2018, 8:24 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1019936133147516929 [hereinafter Trump Tweet July 19] (emphasis
added) (“The Summit with Russia was a great success, except with the real enemy of the people, the Fake News Media. I look forward to our second meeting so that we can start implementing some of the many things discussed, including stopping terrorism, security for Israel,
nuclearFalse . ... [sic].”); President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 13,
2018, 8:30 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1006891643985854464 [hereinafter Trump Tweet June 13] (emphasis added) (“Our Country’s biggest enemy is the Fake
News so easily promulgated by fools!”).
180. Daniel Victor, Trump, Calling Journalists ‘Sick People,’ Puts Media on Edge, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/23/business/media/trump-rallymedia-attack.html.
181. See President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 29, 2018, 5:30
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1023546197129224192 (emphasis added)
(“Had a very good and interesting meeting at the White House with A.G. Sulzberger, Publisher of the New York Times. Spent much time talking about the vast amounts of Fake News
being put out by the media & how that Fake News has morphed into phrase, ‘Enemy of the
People.’ Sad!”) (note that there is no reason to believe Sulzberger agreed with any of this);
see also Trump Tweet July 19, supra note 179; President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 15, 2018, 9:18 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1018530173006692352 (“Unfortunately, no matter how well I do at the Summit, if I was
given the great city of Moscow as retribution for all of the sins and evils committed by Russia . . . .”); President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 17, 2018, 7:25
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though he seemed to express sympathy for the victims of the shooting,
President Trump refused to lower American flags in Maryland (before
ultimately bowing to media pressure).182
For their own part, the Gazette’s public letter on the shooting
suggests attributing at least some of the shooter’s motivation to the
rhetoric President Trump and Yiannopoulos use:
Here’s what else we won’t forget: Death threats and emails from people
we don’t know celebrating our loss, or the people who called for one of
our reporters to get fired because she got angry and cursed on national
television after witnessing her friends getting shot.
We won’t forget being called an enemy of the people.
No, we won’t forget that. Because exposing evil, shining light on
wrongs and fighting injustice is what we do.183

But without a further connection, the link seems tenuous at best—far too
tenuous to override the First Amendment interests in play. 184
However, what if it emerged that the shooter had been retweeting
President Trump’s “enemy of the people” rhetoric? If he had liked
Yiannopoulos’s Instagram post? If he had screamed epithets about the
“fake news media” as he shot reporters? I think causal imminence (as
between President Trump/Yiannopoulos and the harm to reporters) exists
in these hypotheticals. As I discussed in Section III.C, once a particular
environment begins to exist, certain speech can be the equivalent of
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1008506045373845504 (emphasis added)
(“Why was the FBI giving so much information to the Fake News Media. They are not supposed to be doing that, and knowing the enemy of the people Fake News, they put their own
spin on it—truth doesn’t matter to them!”); Trump Tweet June 13, supra note 179; President
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 28, 2018, 7:45 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/868810404335673344 (emphasis added) (“[I]t is very possible that those sources don’t exist but are made up by fake news writers. #FakeNews is the enemy!”); President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (February 17, 2017, 3:48
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/832708293516632065 (emphasis added)
(“The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not
my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!”).
182. Maya Oppenheim, Donald Trump Declines Request to Lower Flags for Capital Gazette Shooting Victims, Says Annapolis Mayor, INDEPENDENT (July 3, 2018, 1:21 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-lower-flags-capital-gazette-shooting-victims-maryland-a8428611.html.
183. Rick Hutzell et al., Our Say: Thank You. We Will Not Forget, CAP. GAZETTE (July 1,
2018, 6:00 AM), http://www.capitalgazette.com/opinion/our_say/ac-ce-our-say-20180630story.html#.
184. Of course, this misses that incitement often exists in the absence of lawless activity.
Many cases, like Rice, only treat incitement as a way of analyzing a First Amendment defense
to criminal conduct in an ex post posture. This is the kind of analysis I am imagining here. A
separate, interesting question exists regarding when, in the absence of lawless activity, the
government can restrict speech ex ante, but that question is beyond the scope of this Article.
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pressing a big, red “lawless action” button.185 The connection between
the speaker and the lawless activity exists all the more when the speaker
(like President Trump) plays a key role in creating such an environment.
And, of course, these stories are obviously not the only ones that
skirt this line.186 Much conduct on the internet raises complicated
questions about context—and that context might differ dramatically from
the moment a speaker speaks to the moment the listener “hears” and acts
upon the speech. But this problem is not new, it just crystallizes and more
regularly presents the difficulty represented by separating speaker from
speech in space and time. Brandenburg was not conceived with this
possibility in mind, and therefore, must now be looked at in light of how
speech exists in the digital world.187 Given that even when courts were
only dealing with books, they were already drifting towards applying
causal—as opposed to spatiotemporal—imminence as the proper
standard, the prudent course is now to make that recognition explicit.

185. See QUINN, supra note 132, at 51–52 (“My ex bragged publicly about how he designed the Manifesto to exploit the key things that make online content go viral . . . . It was a
communal witch hunt, and he took his manifesto to the groups that had a personal interest in
seeing me burn—places that were prone to witch hunts, especially ones frequented by people
who were against women working in games.”).
186. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, To Spy on a Cheating Spouse, REASON.COM (May 31,
2018, 12:00 AM), https://reason.com/archives/2018/05/31/to-spy-on-a-cheating-spouse
(spelling out, in detail, a number of ways to use technology to spy on one’s spouse). For
instance, McCullagh details how to track vehicles: “GPS trackers are tiny magnetic transmitters, typically battery powered, that you can buy for as little as [thirty dollars] plus a monthly
fee. From an app or web browser, the user then monitors the vehicle’s movements. To optimize for legality, be the sole owner of the target vehicle. Joint ownership is second best. If
the only name on the title is your spouse’s, don’t say we didn’t warn you.” Id.; see also, e.g.,
United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Holecek,
739 F.2d 331, 335 (8th Cir. 1984)) (finding no speech protection where defendant gave detailed instructions in how to prepare tax returns that ultimately violated tax return law). It is
also notable that much of this sort of line-toeing can be illegal on grounds that the speaker
does not foresee at all. For example, while the conduct urged in McCullagh’s article above
may not violate the laws they analyze, at least some of it almost certainly violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, various state laws on behavior designed to cause emotional distress, and any number of others. Cf. Green, supra note 172, at 191 (noting that the FBI mistakenly turned away a revenge porn victim, citing the fact that the conduct did not violate
laws about age of consent).
187. See generally Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying
Brandenburg to a lawsuit against a publishing company for publishing instructions on how to
kill, but not discussing how Brandenburg might apply to online publishing).
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APPENDIX I
IMMINENCE CASES AS DECIDED
Lawless Activity Is Imminent Lawless Activity Is Not Imminent
Where the Speaker. . .
Where the Speaker(s). . .


sent an email encouraging
“electronic
civil
disobedience” on a specified
date;1
 published a book with detailed
instructions on how to become
a “hit man”;2
 counseled
and
directly
assisted preparing false tax
returns;3
 held up a sign on television at
a school event proclaiming
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”;4
AND
 offered a reward to anyone
“who kills, maims, or
seriously injures a member of
the American Nazi Party” at
an event five weeks away.5












led a KKK rally where
members were wielding fire
arms, burning a cross, and
chanting “bury the niggers”
and
promising
“revengeance”;6
posted a list of “Top Twenty
Terror Tactics” online;7
created violent video games
and
pornography
that
purportedly inspired violence
in the real world;8
were
fundamentalist
preachers who preached that
the Bible commands that
Christians
must
violate
truancy laws;9
published an article painting
autoerotic asphyxiation in
glowing terms;10
created digitally synthesized
child pornography;11
created posters celebrating the

1. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2009).
2. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 266–67 (4th Cir. 1997).
3. United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985); see also United States
v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1280 (2d Cir. 1990).
4. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 410 (2007).
5. People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) The court found that
“solicitation of murder in connection with a public event of this notoriety, even though five
weeks away, [could] qualify as incitement to imminent lawless action.” Id. at 493.
6. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 n.1, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam).
7. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155–56, 155 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009).
8. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Sanders v.
Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281 (D. Colo. 2002) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
9. Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 576 F. Supp. 1299, 1334 (D. Me. 1983).
10. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022–23 (5th Cir. 1987).
11. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002), superseded by statute, Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, Pub. L.
No. 108-21, § 502(a)(1), (a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 680 (2003).
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killing of abortion doctors and
identifying doctors who had
not yet been killed;12
 posted personal information
combined with racist and
homophobic rhetoric on white
supremacist forums;13
 recorded and released the song
“Suicide Solution” advocating
suicide;14
 called for a strike in a
newspaper advertisement in
violation of a court order;15
 sold books and magazines
whose “primary purpose
encouragement of illegal drug
use” at self-identified “head
shops”;16
AND
 urged killing a judge on a
public blog.17

12. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1090–92, 1092 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, vacated, 422 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005). Note that the majority here analyzes
the question in pure “threat” terms and does not address the Brandenburg argument. I am
sympathetic to the dissent’s argument that the majority opinion somewhat distorts “true
threat” doctrine here, but believe the dissent misses the mark otherwise. The real problem is
that the square peg of the facts in the case would not fit in the round hole of Brandenburg’s
spatiotemporal test and had nothing to do with threat doctrine.
13. United States v. Henry (In re White), No. 2:07cv342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133148,
at *222 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2013).
14. Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1145, 1151 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff’d, 958 F.2d
1084 (11th Cir. 1992).
15. Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 12–13, 12 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
16. High Ol’ Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364, 366, 369–70 (N.D. Ga. 1978),
rev’d, 621 F.2d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131244, at *6–7
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009), aff’d, 720 F.3d 411, 429 (2d Cir. 2013).
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APPENDIX II
IMMINENCE CASES SORTED BY PROPOSED CAUSAL RESULT
Lawless Activity Is Causally
Imminent
Where
the
Speaker(s). . .
 sent an email encouraging
“electronic
civil
disobedience” on a specified
date;1
 created posters celebrating
the killing of abortion
doctors and identifying
doctors who had not yet been
killed;2
 published a book with
detailed instructions on how
to become a “hit man”;3
 counseled and directly
assisted preparing false tax
returns;4
 offered a reward to anyone
“who kills, maims, or
seriously injures a member
of the American Nazi Party”
at an event five weeks
away;5

Lawless Activity Is Not
Causally Imminent Where the
Speaker. . .
 created violent video games
and
pornography
that
purportedly
inspired
violence in the real world;11
 published an article painting
autoerotic asphyxiation in
glowing terms;12
 created digitally synthesized
child pornography;13
 recorded and released the
song “Suicide Solution”
advocating suicide;14
 called for a strike in a
newspaper advertisement in
violation of a court order;15
 held up a sign on television
at
a
school
event
proclaiming “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS”;16
AND
 sold books and magazines

1. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2009).
2. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1092 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, vacated, 422 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005).
3. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 266–67 (4th Cir. 1997).
4. United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985); see also United States v.
Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1280 (2d Cir. 1990).
5. People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). The court found that
“solicitation of murder in connection with a public event of this notoriety, even though five
weeks away, [could] qualify as incitement to imminent lawless action.” Id. at 493.
11. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Sanders v.
Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281 (D. Colo. 2002).
12. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022–23 (5th Cir. 1987).
13. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002), superseded by statute, Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, Pub. L.
No. 108-21, § 502(a)(1), (a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 680 (2003).
14. Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1151 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff’d, 958 F.2d 1084
(11th Cir. 1992).
15. Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 12–13, 12 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
16. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 410 (2007).
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led a KKK rally where
members were wielding fire
arms, burning a cross, and
chanting “bury the niggers”
and
promising
“revengeance”;6
 posted a list of “Top Twenty
Terror Tactics” online;7
 were
fundamentalist
preachers who preached that
the Bible commands that
Christians must violate
truancy laws;8
 posted personal information
combined with racist and
homophobic rhetoric on
white supremacist forums;9
AND
 urged killing a judge on a
public blog.10

389

whose “primary purpose
encouragement of illegal
drug use” at self-identified
“head shops.”17

To address what I see as a prime objection to my sorting, I
acknowledge that one might perhaps set a different threshold for a finding
of causal imminence—in tort terms, a different degree of proximate
causality—but this is a question of placing a line on a relatively welldefined spectrum, rather than one of sorting fact patterns willy-nilly into
two discrete buckets. As was the case in MacPherson, the old rule—
spatiotemporal imminence or privity of contract—has a certain binary
quality,18 while causal imminence (and foreseeability) are both better

6. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 n.1, 468–69 (1969) (per curiam).
7. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155–56, 155 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009).
8. Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 576 F. Supp. 1299, 1334 (D. Me. 1983).
9. United States v. Henry (In re White), No. 2:07cv342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133148,
at *222 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2013).
10. See United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131244, at *6–7
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009), aff’d, 720 F.3d 411, 429 (2d Cir. 2013).
17. High Ol’ Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364, 366, 369–70 (N.D. Ga. 1978),
rev’d, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. With spatiotemporal imminence, something is either going to happen in the next few
minutes within a certain physical range or it is not; someone is either in contractual privity or
they are not. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
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seen as questions about points along a spectrum.19 Application of an
imminence test, given the time frames in which courts operate, would
actually be quite simple.20 By the time a court was looking at any question
of imminence, the court would be well able to tell whether lawless
activity had taken place within the maximum time frame.21

19. Something has a particular degree of foreseeability, or something has a particular degree of causal relation and/or separation. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(per curiam).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The government attempts to connect the posting of the ‘Top Twenty Terror Tactics,’ which occurred
on March 6, 2001, to later unlawful conduct, the earliest of which occurred on March 31,
2001. These events occurred a minimum of three weeks apart, which does not meet the ‘imminence’ required by the Brandenburg standard.”).
21. I am not the only person to make this observation as to causation and the First Amendment. See generally Kenneth J. Brown, Assessing the Legitimacy of Governmental Regulation
of Modern Speech Aimed at Social Reform: The Importance of Hindsight and Causation, 10
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 459 (2002) (demonstrating the connection between government
regulation conducted in the benefit of hindsight).
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